“Any person who, on a permanent or temporary basis, collects, analyzes, transmits or exploits information of interest to national or public security, on behalf of a State or an authorized organization.”
Admit it: it sounds like the job description of a modern compliance officer.
Every day, compliance teams at banks, funds, research institutes and trust companies collect financial and personal data, analyse behaviour, trace transactions and pass on the results to the authorities. Their mission: to spot anomalies, identify risks and, if necessary, provide information to the FIU.
And yet… that’s not the definition of a compliance officer.
It’s that of an intelligence officer, as adopted by NATO and the European Union.
For a long time, it was sold to us as a tool for transparency and trust: compliance protects the customer, the market and the economy.
The reality is quite different. Those subject to the AML Act are not protecting their customers. They are protecting public order.
Due diligence and reporting obligations require them to collect, analyze and, if necessary, report any sensitive information to the FIU, without notifying the customer or obtaining his consent.
To put it plainly: the legislator has turned these professionals into branches of the State, tasked with feeding the financial intelligence chain.
But unlike official agents, they take on this role with no status, no public training and no compensation.
This mission involves much more than simply ticking regulatory boxes. It entails the civil and criminal liability of all parties involved, including the compliance officer.
Luxembourg case law, with Court of Cassation ruling 175/2024 of November 28, 2024, has reiterated that inaction can be assimilated to culpable intent, even if the professional has not directly executed the transaction.. The simple fact of not having acted, of not having declared, when he had the obligation and the capacity to do so, may be enough to engage his liability..
In France, although no compliance officer has yet been convicted of complicity in money laundering, case law on culpable abstention and complicity by omission does exist. Professionals in possession of information that could prevent an offence and who remain inactive may be held criminally liable – as has been the case in a number of cases involving chartered accountants or statutory auditors, convicted of complicity in money laundering or fraud.
In other wordsto do nothing is sometimes to participate.
As if the AML mission wasn’t onerous enough already, the authorities have taken it a step further: they are calling on regulated professionals to spot signs of radicalization in their customers.
In its document“Tendances et analyses 2018-2019“, TRACFIN cites a practical case in which the warning criteria to be noted by the reporting party in the context of suspected terrorist financing include a marked change in physical appearance, or rapid and/or demonstrative religious conversion.
For its part, the ACPR, in a sanction decision dated March 22, 2018 concerning a credit institution, also refers on several occasions to “weak signals” linked to customer behavior or dress. It specifies that these elements must be detected by branch staff, particularly when a customer’s change of dress can be interpreted as an indication of radicalization.
These examples clearly show that tax authorities – and especially their teams in direct contact with the public – are called upon, de facto, to detect signs of ideological or religious radicalization, a role that goes far beyond the purely financial or regulatory remit of compliance.
But who among the compliance officers has been trained to do this?
No one is. And yet, they are now being asked to become psychologists, sociologists and behavioral analysts, with no framework, no protection and no safeguards against cultural, social or political bias.
Another step towards gender confusion, which sooner or later will expose these professionals to accusations of error, discrimination, or worse: complicity by default.
Today, AML taxpayers are at a crossroads:
- Financial analysts when it comes to assessing flows and risks;
- Investigators as they work their way up the chain of operations;
- Alert launchers when transmitting to the CRF ;
- And now, detectors of social signals supposed to anticipate radicalization.
All under threat of civil and criminal sanctions, but without status, without proper training, without official recognition.
No one disputes the usefulness of this system. The fight against money laundering, terrorist financing and financial crime is essential.
But the question is: how far can we delegate public safety missions to private players, without a framework, without compensation and without protection?
